Hunter & Hillman [2017] FamCA 597 (15 August 2017)

Last Updated: 17 August 2017

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

Elisa Rothschild  Lawyer

ORDERS

1. 1. That the husband have leave to withdraw the Contravention Applications filed 2 May 2017 and 18 May 2017.
   2. That until further order the child B born … 1999 (“the child”) live with the father.
   3. That until further order the child spend time and communicate with the mother as follows:-
      <li “=””>(a) Each Saturday from 10.00am to 5.00pm commencing 10 June 2017;

<li “=””>(b) Each alternate Sunday from 10.00am to 5.00pm commencing 11 June 2017;<li “=””>(c) Via Skype each Wednesday from 6.00pm to 6.30pm with the mother to initiate the call; and<li “=””>(d) Such further and other times as may be agreed between the parties in writing.

4. That until further order the mother is restrained from attending upon any medical practitioner with the child whilst the child is in the mother’s care save for in the event of an emergency.
5. That in the event the child requires emergency medical attention whilst in the care of the mother, the mother notify the father as soon as possible and advise the father of the name and contact details of any medical practitioner attended upon.

BY CONSENT

1. 6. That both parents, their servants and agents are restrained from:-
      <li “=””>(a) Denigrating the other parent and/or members of the other parent’s family; and

<li “=””>(b) Discussing any court proceedings involving the parties;

in the presence and/or hearing of the children or any of them.

7. That Order 1 of the Orders dated 9 December 2016 be discharged.
8. That the mother have leave to provide a copy of the psychiatric assessments of both parties prepared by Dr C to any treating psychiatrist.
9. That pursuant to s 68Q of the Family Law Act, the extent to which this order is inconsistent with any family violence order between the parties, the family violence order is invalid.
10. That in the event the child wishes to speak to the mother then the father will facilitate such call or Skype call.
11. That the previous parenting orders with respect to the children D born … 2001 and E born … 2003 remain in full force and effect.
12. That the matter be placed in the pool of cases awaiting trial.
13. That all extant interim applications be dismissed.
14. That pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto and these particulars are included in these orders.

AND THE COURT NOTES:-

That the parties have indicated that it is their intention to seek that the final hearing of this matter be listed with priority in circumstances where there is a current psychiatric assessment of the parties and a long litigation history in the Federal Circuit Court, the Magistrates Court of Victoria and before this Court.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Hunter & Hillman has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FILE NUMBER: MLC 10043 of 2016

Applicant

And

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. This matter was listed before me in the Judicial Duty List on 7 June 2017. The matters listed before the Court that day were:-
   • The father’s Contravention Applications filed 2 May 2017 and 18 May 2017 respectively, both related to the mother’s alleged contravention of interim parenting orders dated 10 November 2016;
   • The father’s Application in a Case filed 1 June 2017 in which he sought interim parenting orders that the children live with him and that the mother’s time with the children be suspended;
   • The mother’s Application in a Case filed 1 June 2017 in which she sought a recovery order in respect of the child B, aged 17 years.
2. The matter was stood down for discussion between the parties at the commencement of the day. At the commencement of the hearing the father sought and was granted leave to withdraw his Contravention Applications.
3. Accordingly, the issues for determination were those raised in the parties’ competing Applications in a Case. The only issue I was asked to determine was the question of the interim care arrangements for the child B who at the time of the hearing was aged 17 years and was due to turn 18 on 14 June 2017, some seven days after the hearing before me. The child has cerebral palsy. In addition, the mother alleges (whilst the father does not admit) that the child has epilepsy and autism. Due to his conditions the child is dependent upon his parents for his physical care.
4. At the conclusion of the hearing I made orders that until further order the child live with the father and spend time with the mother for specified periods. I also made orders restraining the mother from attending upon any medical practitioner with the child whilst he is in her care save for in the event of an emergency. These are my Reasons for Judgment with respect to that decision.

Material relied upon by the parties

5. The father relied upon the following documents: –
   • Application in a Case filed 1 June 2017;
   • Affidavit of the father filed 1 June 2017;
   • Affidavit of the father filed 5 June 2017; and
   • Psychiatric assessment of the mother prepared by Dr C dated 16 February 2017 (Annexure MM-2 of the Father’s Affidavit filed 1 June 2017).
6. The mother relied upon the following documents: –
   • Section 11F Memorandum dated 9 December 2016 prepared by Ms F;
   • Application in a Case filed 1 June 2017;
   • Affidavit of the mother filed 1 June 2017;
   • Response to Application in a Case filed 6 June 2017;
   • Affidavit of the mother filed 6 June 2017;
   • Response to Initiating Application filed 31 October 2016; and
   • Affidavit of Ms G filed 14 November 2016.
7. The ICL relied upon the following documents: –
   • Report of the father prepared by Dr C dated 3 February 2017 (Annexure MM-1 of the father’s affidavit filed 1 June 2016);
   • Report of the mother prepared by Dr C dated 16 February 2017 (Annexure MM-2 of the father’s affidavit filed 1 June 2016);
   • Section 69ZW Report prepared by Ms H dated 31 May 2017;
   • Child inclusive conference memorandum dated 9 December 2016

BACKGROUND

8. The father is the applicant in the proceedings. He is aged 49 years and lives in Suburb Q. He is employed as a technician.
9. The mother, the respondent in the proceedings is aged 45 years and lives in Suburb J.
10. The parties commenced cohabitation and married in 1996. Separation occurred in 2005 and the parties divorced in 2006.
11. There are three children of the marriage, namely the child who was aged 17 at the time of the hearing, D, aged 15 years and E, aged 14 years. In addition, the mother has two other children from a previous relationship who live with her, twins K and L who were aged 4 years at the time of hearing.
12. The proceedings were commenced by the father in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in October 2016. The father seeks orders on a final basis that the children live with him and that he have sole parental responsibility for them. The mother has filed a response to that application seeking final orders that the children live with her.
13. On 10 November 2016 interim orders were made by consent that provide as follows:-
    • That the children live with the mother;
    • That the children spend time and communicate with the father each week from 6.00pm Friday to 6.00pm Saturday, by telephone for specified periods and during long summer holiday and school term holidays for specified periods;
    • The changeovers for the father’s time to occur at Suburb M station with the mother or her nominee to deliver the children to the station and the father to return the children to the parking bay on the mother’s property;
    • The parties to be psychiatrically assessed by a psychiatrist nominated by the Independent Children’s Lawyer;
    • The parents be restrained from consuming illicit substances prior to and during periods the children are in their care, from consuming alcohol to excess, from discussing the proceedings and denigrating the other parent.
14. Notwithstanding the interim orders made in November 2016, the children E and D do not currently spend time with the father pursuant to those orders. The father has continued to spend time with the child pursuant to the orders.
15. The psychiatric assessment of the parties prepared by Dr C was released on 11 May 2017. In his report dated 3 February 2017 Dr C assessed that the father suffered from mild social and generalised anxiety disorder and exhibited some obsessive-compulsive personality and dependant personality traits.^[1]
16. In his report dated 16 February 2017 Dr C assessed the mother as suffering from recurrent episodes of Factitious Disorder Imposed on Self and on Another as well as exhibiting Borderline Histrionic and Narcissistic Personality Traits.^[2] The mother does not accept that diagnosis.
17. The father collected the child to spend time with him on 12 May 2017 and 26 May 2017. He deposes at paragraphs 5 and 6 of his affidavit filed 1 June 2017 that there was hostility and verbal abuse towards him by D at changeover on 12 May 2017. He alleges that the child was distressed and upset during the changeovers on 12 and 26 May 2017. The mother in her affidavit filed 6 June 2017 denies those allegations.
18. The father did not return the child to the mother’s care at the conclusion of his time which commenced on 26 May 2017.
19. The father attended upon Suburb M Magistrates’ Court on 25 May 2017 and sought and was granted an interim intervention order naming the father and the child as protected persons. That order suspended the operation of the interim parenting orders made 10 November 2016. Those proceedings were otherwise adjourned for hearing in July 2017.
20. The father relied upon the diagnosis of Dr C in support of his application for an intervention order on behalf of the child. The matters relied upon by him in that application included:-

The respondent is giving medication to our son [the child] for a condition he does not have. I believe the respondent has lied to doctors to get the medication and I have noticed a deterioration in his physical and mental capacity in the past few weeks. I am unsure what medication she may be giving him. …The respondent has been diagnosed by a Court-ordered psychiatrist as having factitious disorder imposed on self, factitious disorder imposed on another, borderline and histrionic and narcissistic personality traits. My son is in immediate danger of further deterioration of his condition. He is wheelchair-bound and can’t fend for himself. I am seeking a suspension of the current family law orders.^[3]

21. Following the making of the interim intervention order, on 1 June 2017 the father filed his current application before the Court. On the same day the mother filed an Application in a Case seeking the return of the child to her care.
22. Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) indicated at the commencement of the hearing that the ICL could not support the return of the child to the mother, having regard to the assessment of Dr C.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

23. The Court is being asked to make interim parenting orders. When determining those issues the paramount consideration is the best interests of the child or children the subject of the proceedings (s 60CA of the Family Law Act 1975 Cth (“the Act”)). In Goode & Goode [2006] FamCAFC 1346; (2006) FLC 93-286 (“Goode & Goode”) at paragraph 82 the Full Court set out the legislative pathway to be followed in interim parenting cases.
24. At paragraph 68 of Goode the Full Court stated:-

…the procedure for making interim parenting orders will continue to be an abridged process where the scope of the enquiry is “significantly curtailed”. Where the court cannot make findings of fact it should not be drawn into issues of fact or matters relating to the merits of the substantive case where findings are not possible. The court also looks to the less contentious matters, such as the agreed facts and issues not in dispute and would have regard to the care arrangements prior to separation, the current circumstances of the parties and their children, and the parties’ respective proposals for the future.

25. The Full Court again considered the approach to be adopted in interim parenting cases in Banks & Banks [2015] FamCAFC 36; (2015) FLC 93-637 (“Banks & Banks”). At paragraphs 48 to 50 the Full Court stated:-

…By their nature, interim parenting proceedings should be confined to those issues which, in the best interests of the child, require a determination prior to a proper determination at a trial. The fact such disputes are commonly dealt with in an overcrowded Court list make it even more desirable to identify with precisions which can, or should be resolved on an interim basis.

…there is a risk that in discussing every s 60CC factor, the judicial officer may lose sight of the forest for the trees. It is also important to stress here that the requirement to “consider” each factor does not mean each must be discussed, especially where the evidence leads inexorably to a particular conclusion: SCVG & KLD (2014) FLC 93-582.

When it is obvious that the findings made as to some of the s 60CC factors will be determinative of the child’s best interests on an interim basis, it is a sterile and unnecessary exercise to address other factors. Moreover, it will be a sterile exercise to determine whether or not particular facts are disputed if they are relevant only to one of the non-determinative s 60CC considerations. Properly understood, we do not interpret what was said in Goode as meaning that in an interim case, each and every fact must be characterised as disputed or not; and that each s 60CC factor must be traversed where it is obvious on the facts and issues joined that there are only one or two decisive factors.

26. In accordance with the decisions of Goode & Goode and Banks & Banks, in determining this matter I will focus on the s 60CC factors that are most relevant to determining the best interests of the children.
27. At the centrepiece of this interim parenting dispute was the question of whether or not there was a need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm when in his mother’s care. The case of the father, supported by the ICL, was that the child is at risk in his mother’s care and both relied upon the evidence of Dr C in support of that submission.
28. Given the importance of Dr C’s evidence, I gave leave for him to be called to give oral evidence and to be cross-examined.

ORDERS SOUGHT

29. At the commencement of the hearing, each party filed a Minute of proposed order. The father’s proposed orders (Exhibit F-1) sought that:-
    • The children live with him;
    • That he have sole parental responsibility for the children;
    • That the children’s time with the mother be suspended;
    • That the mother be restrained from discussing the proceedings in any form of publication including on-line media, printed material or public broadcast;
    • That leave be granted for the affidavit of Dr C to be provided to VCAT and the Magistrates’ Court.
30. During the course of the hearing the father’s position altered. He did not press for orders restraining the mother from approaching or remaining within 200 metres of him or the children. Similarly, the father did not press his application to restrain the mother’s use of social media.
31. The mother’s proposals were set out in Exhibit M-1. The orders sought by her included:-
    • That the child be returned to the mother’s care;
    • In the event that the father does not return the child to her care that a recovery order be issued.
32. The Minute of orders sought on behalf of the ICL (Exhibit ICL-1) provided:-
    • That the child live with the father;
    • That both parents be restrained from denigrating the other or members of the other’s family or discussing any Court proceedings involving the party in the presence or hearing of the children.

Dr C’s Evidence

33. Dr C undertook a psychiatric assessment of the mother on 10 February 2017. His assessment of the mother is set out in his report dated 16 February 2017 which is annexed to the affidavit of the father filed 1 June 2017. Dr C’s report records a detailed history obtained from the mother.
34. That history included her academic history in which she reported that she gained a place at N University to undertake a degree. Further Dr C reports that he was informed that the mother undertook a second degree and that she completed her time at N University with a double degree.
35. As to her work history, Dr C reports that the mother stated that she was invited to undertake management training with the public service. She developed a brain tumour, an Anaplastic Astrocytoma and as a result was required to take leave. Dr C reports that the mother was not discharged from employment on medical grounds but that some years later, realising that she was still employed, she resigned.
36. Thereafter Dr C reports the mother informing him that she had worked for a number of different employers. She reports having developed her own business and states that she has published one book and is working on its sequel currently. Dr C reports the mother as stating that “one is never entirely free of a disease”.
37. Dr C also records the mother’s reported relationship history. He notes that when describing her third significant relationship she reported that she suffered a recurrence of her brain tumour. She alleged that her children from that relationship were born as a result of rape within marriage and that she was subjected to emotional, sexual and physical abuse during that relationship.
38. In describing her children to Dr C, she is reported as stating that:-
    • the child is severely disabled, having suffered a post-meningitis quadriplegia, spastic cerebral palsy. Dr C notes the mother’s allegation that the father has nothing to do with the management of the child’s medical conditions. The mother informed Dr C that the child has suffered from frequent epileptic fits in the last 18 months and is being treated by a neurologist and has also a diagnosis of two “transient” brain tumours and a frontal lobe tumour;
    • D is reported to Dr C by the mother as having been assaulted by a teenager when she was aged three and in childcare and she is now seeing a psychologist;
    • E is also seeing a psychologist as a result of her distress at the discovery that one of her younger sisters has allegedly been sexually abused by her paternal uncle;
    • K, aged four, has allegedly been sexually abused by the father’s brother. The mother reports to Dr C that K has continuing problems with her urethra and is to be seen by a paediatric gynaecologist;
    • The mother reports to Dr C that L also has problems, being a victim of abuse by witnessing the abuse of K at the hands of her paternal uncle.
39. The mother’s description to Dr C of her own medical history is equally fraught as that of her children. Dr C notes that the mother reported that she was diagnosed with a carcinoma of the uterus at age 19 for which she was treated with chemotherapy and radiotherapy. She alleges that her medical records in relation to that illness were stolen.
40. Dr C also reports the mother as stating that at age 22 she was diagnosed with a brain tumour for which she was treated with radiotherapy. She alleges there was a recurrence of that tumour in 2008 and again she was treated with chemotherapy, naturopathy and diet.
41. In his discussion with the mother Dr C notes the conflict between the history provided by the mother and that given by her sister, noting the mother’s sister’s challenge to the mother’s claims that:-
    • she has had two types of cancer. Dr C noted the absence of medical records to verify the mother’s claims;
    • the mother was school captain. The mother’s explanation was that “while she was elected by the fellow pupils she was not allowed to take up the position because she had been suspended”;
    • the mother has a double degree. Dr C states that he informed the mother that it would be easy to meet her sister’s challenge as tertiary qualifications are a matter of public record. The mother’s response to that information was reported to be one of surprise. Only then did she inform Dr C that she discovered only last year that she had not actually one unit of her Degree and therefore her degree had not been conferred. Similarly with respect to her second degree which she claims was “designed specifically for her by the Dean of N” she reported that that degree was not bestowed upon her in a formal ceremony. She conceded that her second degree “may not be complete”.
42. Dr C also discussed with the mother a range of other claims made by her with respect to her history.
43. At page 9 of his report Dr C notes that Factitious Disorders (previously Munchausen syndrome) are characterised by:

Factitious Disorder Imposed on self

1. Falsification of physical or psychological signs or symptoms, or induction of injury or disease, associated with identified deception.
2. The individual presents himself or herself to others as ill, impaired or injured.

100. The deceptive behaviour is evident even in the absence of obvious external rewards.

4. The behaviour is not better explained by another mental disorder, such as delusional disorder or another psychotic disorder.

Recurrent Episodes (two or more events of falsification or illness and/or induction of injury)

Factitious disorder imposed on another (previously Factitious Disorder by proxy)

1. Falsification of physical or psychological signs or symptoms, or induction of injury or disease, in another, associated with identified deception.
2. The individual presents another individual (victim) to others as ill, impaired or injured.

100. The deceptive behaviour is evident even in the absence of obvious external rewards.

4. The behaviour is not better explained by another mental disorder, such as delusional disorder or another psychotic disorder.

Recurrent episodes (two or more events of falsification of illness and/or induction of injury).

44. Dr C’s assessment of the mother set out at page 10 of his report is as follows:-

My concern in relation to my diagnostic profile is that [the mother] has created an identity and a professional role for herself built around not only her own illness and history of sexual abuse but also around the illnesses and alleged abuse of her children. While the allegations of sexual abuse by [the mother’s] former brother in law have been investigated and a conclusion that the assaults did not occur, two of [the mother’s] daughters are now in therapy on the basis of the assaults and the impact of them and [K] is now to be examined by a paediatric gynaecologist on the basis that she has ongoing genito-urinary problems secondary to the alleged assault. There is also concern as to the neurological diagnosis of the child and his new treatment regime.

45. Having regard to those matters Dr C diagnosed the mother as having recurrent episodes of Factitious Disorder Imposed on Self and Factitious Disorder Imposed on Another. The mother challenged Dr C’s diagnosis and counsel representing her sought the opportunity to cross-examine Dr C with respect to those matters.
46. During his oral evidence Dr C was asked as to the impact of his diagnosis upon a person’s parenting capacity. His evidence was that the Factitious Disorder imposed on Another is where the mother’s need for support or validation are imposed by creating medical conditions where the children are then subjected unnecessarily to treatment. The impact of the condition upon the mother was observed to be that her parenting capacity is driven by her own needs not as a response to the needs of the child. Dr C observed that such parenting is “inherently abusive”.
47. As to how that diagnosis would impact on the mother’s ability to care for the child Dr C stated:-

My concern is that the risk to [the child] is that he would be exposed to unnecessary investigations and possibly unnecessary treatment. And as a 17 year old disabled child – I haven’t met [the child], but he may not be, as other adults are, able to provide an independent report as to his own difficulties and needs and therefore the doctors may be entirely dependent upon the reports of the mother.

48. In response to questions from the ICL Dr C said he also had concerns as to the mother’s capacity to comply with Court orders as a result of her belief that her concerns are justifiable and reasonable.
49. Dr C agreed that the risk to the child in the mother’s care was minimised over the weekend period when generally, medical facilities are not available or easily accessed.
50. Dr C confirmed that one of the bases upon which he made his diagnosis was the lack of corroborating evidence with respect to the child’s medical issues and also in relation to the mother’s own medical issues. As to the allegation that the child has brain tumours including a transient brain tumour, Dr C stated that he did not know what a transient brain tumour is.
51. Dr C confirmed that the child’s positon in his mother’s care is compromised in circumstances where his treating medical practitioners are largely reliant upon the mother’s reports as to his condition to formulate a diagnosis and treatment. He confirmed that the history provided by a parent would be the primary source of information upon which diagnosis is based. One of the risks to the child might be that excessive medication is being prescribed or alternatively, medication is not being given based on the reports of the mother.
52. Dr C confirmed that from a psychiatric point of view the child was not at risk in the father’s care.
53. Following the evidence of Dr C the matter was stood down to enable the parties to consider that evidence before making further submissions.
54. The ICL’s position modified following that evidence to seek orders that the child live with the father, and also that he should spend time with the mother on weekends from 10.00am to 5.00pm each Saturday and Sunday. The ICL emphasised the importance of the child spending time and communicating with his mother and siblings. The ICL also sought orders that the mother be restrained from taking the child to medical practitioners save in the event of an emergency.
55. The father’s position also altered following the evidence of Dr C. He sought orders that the mother spend time as proposed by the ICL, albeit that such time be supervised. He offered no proposal as to who would provide such supervision.
56. The mother maintained the position that notwithstanding the evidence of Dr C that the child should be returned to her care. In support of that submission the mother’s counsel emphasised the fact that the mother has been the child’s primary carer since the parties’ separation. Moreover, she submitted that unless returned to her care, the child would be separated from his four younger sisters. It was submitted that such a scenario would likely distress the child and cause anxiety to him. It was submitted that in circumstances where there are no specific allegations of abuse or misuse of drugs that there is no risk of harm to the child and accordingly he should be returned to the mother’s care.
57. Counsel for the mother sought to emphasise her client’s instructions as to the child’s alleged brain tumours. It was submitted that the child was assessed at N Medical Centre in respect of those matters. The mother denied the father’s allegations that he has been excluded from aspects of his medical care.
58. Ultimately these are factual issues that will be resolved upon a testing of evidence at trial. Throughout the interim hearing I emphasised to all parties that in determining these matters I was looking to the less contentious issues between them and to the independent evidence to assist me in determining future interim parenting arrangements.

CONCLUSION

59. As I have already noted, there are a range of matters raised and reported by the mother to Dr C referred to above which gave rise to his concerns as to her presentation and ultimately resulted in his diagnosis of the mother with Factitious Disorder Imposed on Self and Another. Notwithstanding the matters raised by Dr C in his report which was received by the parties in May 2017, the mother has adduced no evidence to the Court that would alleviate those concerns. She places no evidence before the Court that addresses or answers the issues raised with respect to her academic history or medical history.
60. The evidence before the Court as to the child’s medical history is limited and incomplete, being a letter from his paediatrician, Dr O to his general medical practitioner dated 28 May 2017 reporting as to a recent appointment and a short email from Dr O to the mother’s lawyer dated 29 May 2017 (both annexed to the mother’s affidavit filed 1 June 2017). Neither letter refers to the child’s diagnosis with brain tumours.
61. The mother placed heavy reliance upon those letters. In my view those reports must be considered cautiously having regard to the evidence of Dr C that the accuracy of such assessments may be influenced by the reliability or otherwise of the information provided to them by the mother.
62. The evidence of Dr C both in his report and during his oral evidence was detailed and compelling. He raises genuine concerns as to the mother’s presentation, the range of allegations made by her and the lack of corroboration of many of those matters. It is those factors that have influenced his diagnosis of the mother. Dr C’s evidence was clear insofar as the potential impact of the mother’s condition upon her ability to care for the child. I accept that evidence and am satisfied that the child may be at risk of physical harm in the mother’s care.
63. The mother raised issue as to the father’s capacity to care for the child. Again, whilst she has raised such concerns the reality is that the father has been an active and involved parent in the child’s life, it being common ground that he has regularly spent time with the child. It was conceded by the mother to the family consultant at interview for the Child Inclusive Memorandum on 9 December 2016 that the child enjoys a “loving relationship with his father and seeks to spend time with him”.^[4] The family consultant reported that the child presented as a happy child who “likes his father and his partner”. In conclusion the family consultant reported that the father has a long history of providing care for the children without assistance of carer support.^[5]
64. the child has significant disabilities and is unable to care for himself. Having regard to Dr C’s evidence, and given the child’s vulnerabilities, I am satisfied that it is appropriate and in the child’s best interests that he remain in the father’s care at this time. Given the history of the child’s care and the fact that he has up until recently been in his mother’s primary care and lived with his younger siblings I am satisfied that it is appropriate and in his best interests that he have the opportunity of spending time and communicating with his mother and siblings.
65. I have regard to the evidence of Dr C that the risk of harm to the child is lessened if his time with the mother is spent on weekends when there is a reduced capability of her accessing medical facilities. Given that evidence I am satisfied that it is appropriate and in the child’s best interests that he spend time with his mother each weekend.
66. Whilst the father sought an order that such time be supervised he put no proposals before the Court as to how such supervision would be implemented. Further, as discussed above I accept the evidence of Dr C that any risk to the child is minimised by such time occurring during weekend periods. Accordingly, I am satisfied that it is appropriate that such time occur each Saturday from 10.00am to 5.00pm and each alternate Sunday from 10.00am to 5.00pm. I will also make provision for the child to communicate with his mother by Skype each Wednesday.
67. I am also satisfied having regard to the evidence of Dr C that it is appropriate that the mother be restrained from attending upon any medical practitioner with the child whilst he is in his mother’s care save for in the event of an emergency.
68. Whilst the father sought orders for D and E to live with him also, that application was not seriously pressed. Currently, neither D nor E is spending time with the father and all of the evidence before me indicates that were such order made both children would likely refuse to remain in the father’s care. Pursuant to the November 2016 orders the children are attending counselling with Ms P and that order continues. D and E do not suffer the same vulnerabilities as the child with respect to the ongoing management of medical issues and as such the risks to them if they remain in the mother’s care are not as acute. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that it would be in their interests to make any interim orders changing their current living arrangements.
69. I note that the parties have otherwise agreed to orders with respect to non-denigration or discussion of the proceedings in the presence or hearing of the children and that the mother be permitted to provide Dr C’s report to any treating psychiatrist engaged by her. Otherwise, I have dismissed interim applications and the matter has been placed in the pool of cases awaiting allocation to a judicial docket.

I certify that the preceding sixty-nine (69) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Johns delivered on 15 August 2017

Associate:

Date: 15 August 2017